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INTRODUCTION'
In October 1989, the Hungarian Communist regime collapsed and
was replaced by a democractic government. This new government was
confronted with a visible and grave concern: environmental degradation.
In just three years, the new Hungarian government, sometimes of its own
impetus, sometimes at the prodding of environmentalists and foreign
governments, has taken tremendous steps toward establishing palpable
environmental legislation.' More importantly, it has created an adminis-
1. Many valuable commentaries address the wider issue of post-communist environ-
mental protection efforts in Eastern Europe; in contrast, this Note concentrates solely on
Hungarian legislation, and legislation concerning groundwater pollution in particular. There
are three reasons for this limited choice. First, concentrating on one nation's approach to
a single source of pollution allows time and space for the magnified examination of the
complicated reasons for the current bottleneck of legislative efforts which has developed
throughout most Eastern European countries. Second, Hungary was specifically chosen as
the site of the research efforts because it has been recognized by both the World Bank and
the United States Environmental Protection Agency as the Eastern European country with
the greatest potential for improvement. Interview with Stephen Wassersug, Program
Manager of the Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe, in Budapest,
Hungary (Aug. 13, 1992). Such strong potential is primarily due to its less severe
environmental degradation, its relatively consistent policy of thorough statistical research,
and its large number of highly trained and eager engineers, legal scholars and activists. Id.
Last, water pollution in particular was chosen as the focus of research because of the greater
number and quality of available statistics, regulations, and studies.
This Note is a partial sequel to Margaret Bowman & David Hunter, Environmental
Reforms in Post-Communist Central Europe: From High Hopes to Hard Reality, 13 MICH.
J. INT'L. L. 921 (1992). It is a sequel in that it picks up where the Article's brief section
on Hungary leaves off, using the same foci of analysis as the Article. This Note, however,
focuses exclusively on Hungary, rather than all Central European countries, and as such,
enjoys the luxury of delving much deeper into the legal, historical, and political setting of
the country's struggle for improvement of the environment.
It should be clear, however, that this Note reaches a different conclusion about the rate
of Hungary's progress toward environmental protection. The Bowman and Hunter article
remains critical of what it deems sluggish progress by the Hungarian Parliament. This Note
is cautiously pleased with what it views as remarkable progress.
2. See the following interviews: Interview with Margaret Bowman, Director of the
Environmental Program for Central and Eastern Europe, Environmental Law Institute, in
Washington, D.C. (Aug. 26, 1992); Interview with Dr. Andrds Homonnay, Managing
Director of ENVIMARK, Hydro-Environmental Marketing and Informatics Ltd., in
Budapest, Hungary (Aug. 13, 1992); Interview with David Hunter, Staff Attorney, Center
for International Environmental Law (CIEL) - United States, in Washington D.C. (Aug. 25,
1992); Interview with Sdndor Kisgybrgy, Director, Department for Water Quality,
Hungarian Ministry of Environment and Regional Policy, in Budapest, Hungary (Aug. 13,
1992); Interview with Dr. Peter Literathy, Director of Institute for Water Pollution Control,
VITUKI, Water Resources Research Center, in Budapest, Hungary (Aug. 13, 1992);
Interview with Stephen Wassersug, Program Manager, Regional Environmental Center for
Central and Eastern Europe, in Budapest, Hungary (Aug. 6, 1992); Telephone interview
with Robert Wilkinson, Director, Graduate Program in Environmental Sciences, Central
European University in Budapest, Hungary (Aug. 17, 1992). Transcripts of these interviews
are on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law.
3. See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion.
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trative and information-gathering infrastructure capable of sustaining a
cohesive system of environmental protection initiatives. Although the
path to further progress is littered with obstacles, this East European
country has proven itself a worthy warrior in the fight against environ-
mental deterioration.
I. THE RISING TIDE OF WATER POLLUTION
As a first step in curbing environmental abuses, the Hungarian
government commenced an evaluation of the damages that arose from
years of toxic dumping in the nation's water sources. The Hungarian
government conducted a comprehensive evaluation, but also permitted the
independent research of non-governmental organizations and scholars.
The government deserves commendation for its part in instigating such
an open evaluation.
A. Swift Disclosure: Hungary's Admitted Disaster
Although Hungarian environmental reform has yet to reduce actual
pollution levels, the Hungarian government nevertheless deserves praise
for its efforts. Hungarian environmental protection efforts should be
admired, first for the rapid disclosure of incriminating statistics, and
second, for bold legislative initiatives.'
Under the Communist dictatorship, the Hungarian government
consistently ignored alarming pollution levels.' The environment had
been deteriorating at a frightful rate.7 Unfortunately, the Communist
government never disclosed the state of the environment to the public.
Tunnels now so polluted that they are impassable to pedestrians, once
majestic views now clouded in exhaust fumes, and increasingly younger
inhabitants suffering from lung and heart ailments are just some of the
emerging signs of a country in environmental decay.8 When the
Communist government in Hungary fell, the new democracy released the
long hidden statistics documenting the obvious degradation of Hungary's
natural resources. The evidence of environmental degradation came fast
4. Id.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See Gyula Bdndi, State of Environmental Law: Hungary (Jan. 1992) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law) (summarizing the
current state of environmental law in Hungary, including an analysis of Hungarian
regulations and the economic problems facing administrators).
7. See ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION, THE WORLD BANK, HUNGARY: ENVIRONMENTAL
IssuES (1990).
8. Id. at 96.
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and furious, both from scientists and the government itself.
In its first official environmental assessment, the government-funded
Institute for Environmental Management published its "1989 State of
Environment in Hungary & Environmental Policy" on behalf of the
Hungarian Parliament.9 The results were strikingly blunt. The report
began with the following summary:
Our soils, surface and underground waters are contaminated as a
consequence of the inadequate solution of the treatment and disposal of
the wastes produced, the industrial and communal sewages, [and]
sewage muds as well as the inadequately applied fertilizers .. . The
quantity of wastes produced in the period 1962-86 increased by 24%.
. Dumping the settlement wastes presents a problem, primarily because
the capacity of the dumping sites seems to be exhausted. There is no
improvement in the field of separated collection due to economic reasons
and way of thinking, and also to the lack of adequate technological
conditions...io
This comprehensive report also provided a categorical evaluation of
the political, economic and social sources of Hungary's environmental
woes. Without blaming the Communist system for the country's
environmental decay, the report stressed that the strong push for an
economy dominated by heavy industry was a causal factor." It further
identified the switch to collectivized farming techniques as a disastrous
plan. The report stated:
The forced pace of development of energetics, coal mining, metallurgy
and heavy industry neglected the viewpoints of environmental protection
and gave rise to significant detrimental effects. Small-scale farming,
which is in good harmony with nature, was replaced by the more
productive large-scale agricultural units which are difficult to harmonize
with nature, and therefore cause additional harms to the environment.
12
In a further stab at the excesses of the unnamed, but obvious, political
predecessor, the report added: "The development of infrastructure started
to lag behind, and, in addition to the production processes requiring
incredibly high level[s] of raw-material and energy utilization, consump-
tion became wasteful and pollutant.
13
9. INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT & INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
DEVELOPMENT, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN HUNGARY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
(Miklos Bulla & Istvan Juhasz eds., 1990) thereinafter STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN
HUNGARY].
10. Id at 12, 17 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 7.
12. Id. (emphasis added).
13. Id.
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The report demonstrates that even the new, economically pressed
government realized the urgency of the water contamination problem and
was prepared to respond. 4  For example, S.ndor Kisgyirgy, the
Department Head for Water Quality in the Hungarian Ministry of
Environment and Regional Policy, agrees that the levels of water
contamination in Hungary's water sources require immediate attention.
5
Passing smoothly over the threshold issue of whether the Parliament
recognizes the immediate severity of Hungarian water pollution,
KisgyiSrgy quickly turns the issue toward questions of how to approach
the problem.'6 He does not ignore the suggestions of environmental and
legal scholars, but he does not know how to implement them. In the past
year, Kisgytrgy elaborates, members of Parliament voiced over 500
suggestions, comments, and criticisms concerning the relationship
between the private property system currently being designed and
environmental reform.'7 The sheer magnitude of these responses proved
unwieldy and indigestible. As a result, the government choked on its
response. Yet, in light of its admissions, official environmental status
reports and Parliamentary debates, the Hungarian government has at least
rolled the proverbial ball to the top of the hill.
Despite the government's effort, educated observers have remained
critical. Independent Hungarian and American scholars, environmental
organizations such as the Danube Circle, and even the Regional Environ-
mental Center for Central & Eastern Europe are unsatisfied. These
14. Several respected scholars argue that Hungary should not be congratulated for
speedy acknowledgment of its environmental problems because Parliament required one and
a half years to decide that it would construct any environmental law at all. This Note seeks
to advance the opposite argument; that in light of Hungary's political, economic, judicial,
and administrative structure following the establishment of the new democracy, the time
taken to come to grips with the country's environmental dilemma has been extremely
reasonable. See Margaret Bowman & David Hunter, Environmental Reforms in Post-
Communist Central Europe: From High Hopes to Hard Reality, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 921
(1992).
15. See Kisgydrgy, supra note 2.
16. Andrds Homonnay, an attorney from the quasi-governmental VITUKI Water
Resources Institute, comments that the Hungarian Parliament has often been criticized for
turning most efforts for water pollution reform into a political maneuver. Homonnay, supra
note 2.
17. The shift from the previous communist government to the new democracy created
the issue of how to distribute the previously state-owned, industrial and real property to the
Hungarian people. The new government faces substantial difficulty in determining how to
allocate such property among prior owners with conflicting, dated, or absent ownership
papers. More importantly, the new Democracy faces a similar problem with distributing
shares in Hungarian corporations previously owned and operated by the government. This
public distribution of corporate shares is of utmost importance to environmental legislation
policy, because it will determine the placement of liability for past and present industrial
water pollution. See Carol Williams, Hungary to Hold First Free Election in 40 Years
Today, Los ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 25, 1990, at Al, A14.
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groups cite the one and a half year delay by the Hungarian government
before it would admit the existance of a severe environmental problem
requiring quick attention.
In the face of such criticism, however, the Hungarian Parliament
should be cautiously congratulated for its relatively speedy acknowledg-
ment and subsequent measurement of the extent of Hungarian environ-
mental damage. Such praise should come in light of the considerably
greater time taken by the American government in assessing its own
environmental problems. Yet, praise should be guarded; the road does
not end here, and often the Parliament has moved forward only at the
prodding of its critics. It is the Parliament's critics who deserve much of
the praise.
A review of American environmental reform initiatives, beginning in
the 1950s, proves that Hungary has much of which it can be proud. For
example, California, one of the first American states to be confronted
with a tangible pollution concern in the form of smog, took over six years
to admit that vehicle exhaust was a primary culprit, and over ten years to
produce any significant form of environmentally protective legislation. 8
When compared with the decade during which the California legislature
avoided addressing its own environmental degradation, the Hungarian
Ministry's efforts of the past two years are at least above excessive
reproach. 9
B. Subsequent Surveys: A Flood of Statistics
Not only did Hungary's new democratic government seek to evaluate
its country's environmental danger, it allowed scholars and scientists the
18. JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON
CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION 1940-1975,at 259 (1977). Although Hungary admittedly possesses the technology necessary to
understand the causal connection between auto admissions and rising pollution levels,
technology yet unknown to the United States in the 1950s, Hungary's political and industrial
preoccupation with Communism left such technology largely untouched for over threedecades. As seen from the benign activities of the early Hungarian "monitoring agencies,"
Hungary in 1989 was arguably at a technological level comparable to the United States of
the 1950s.
19. Two factors should be noted in order to avoid undue praise. First, the speed withwhich the new Democratic government began assessing its environmental pollution is
undoubtedly due to the fact that the previous Communist government could both
conveniently and rightfully be blamed for the dismal state of affairs. Second, although the
Hungarian government should be commended for publishing STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT
IN HUNGARY, supra note 9, it should not be congratulated for its efforts to disseminate thisinformation to the public. Only approximately 100 copies were published, and most of
those copies were distributed to government officials and researchers. Literathy, supra note
2.
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opportunity to develop independent studies. The results of these studies
were grim, but as a result, the new Hungarian government has shed the
vestiges of Communist rule by refusing to suppress such information.
The non-governmental and quasi-governmental studies which cropped
up after 1989 were uniformly critical' The reports confirmed that water
flowing in from abroad was already significantly polluted with sewage
and waste waters replete with detergents, cyanide, ether, chromium,
sulfuric acid, sulfide, lead and liquid manure.2 In passing through
Hungary, the water became heavily contaminated with arsenic, insecti-
cides, chlorine, factory sewage and infectious diseases.' These private
studies also recorded alarmingly high nitrate levels which were linked to
increased intestinal and stomach cancer in Hungarians who drank the
contaminated water.23 The Technical Department of the World Bank
Environmental Division followed close on the heels of the Hungarian
government in assessing the damage. It contributed newly acquired
statistics in its November 1990 evaluation of Hungarian pollution levels.
It was as blunt as the Hungarian government's State of the Environment
report, but included far greater depth and magnitude. For example, the
World Bank reported: "In practice, the majority of groundwater used for
domestic or municipal purposes is distributed to consumers virtually
without any form of treatment except in some cases disinfection ... "
The World Bank also strongly criticized both existing and earlier
efforts by the Hungarian government to improve the quality of Hungary's
drinking and bathing watery3 In characterizing the Hungarian govern-
ment's approach to increased water pollution, the World Bank explained:
"When water falls below a certain quality, the usual response is to
20. See B6la Hock & Ldszl6 Somly6dy, Freshwater Resources and Water Quality, in
STATE OF THE HUNGARIAN ENVIRONMENT 67, 77 (Don Hinrichsen and Gydrgy Enyedi eds.,
1990); see ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION, WORLD BANK, supra note 7.
21. ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION, WORLD BANK, supra note 7, at 38. This report indicates
that 94% of surface water in Hungary flows in from neighboring countries and is already
polluted upon its arrival.
22. Hock & S6mly6dy, supra note 20, at 77; ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION, WORLD BANK,
supra note 7, at 37-38.
23. Studies have indicated that in Bors6d and Szab6lcs-Szdtmar counties, there have
been higher rates of cancer of the stomach and digestive tract where the local drinking water
was contaminated with high nitrate levels. ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION, WORLD BANK, supra
note 7, at 37. Regarding arsenic pollution, the Hungarian National Institute of Hygiene
(OKI) reported that 450,000 residents of six Hungarian counties were drinking water loaded
with two to three times the acceptable standard of arsenic. Such contamination often leads
to high infant mortality due to spontaneous abortions, low birth weight, and increased risk
of heart disease. Id.




terminate the supply. During the 1980s, the amount of public water
supply capacity which had to be shut down due to quality decrease to
Class I was 150 cubic meters per day. 26 In addition, the World Bank
reported that any prospects for improvements in overall Hungarian water
quality were similarly grim. Over a third of all public water sources were
expected to become contaminated with chemical, sewage, and bacterial
pollution before the year 2000.27 This prediction is particularly disturbing
when the World Bank determined that more than half of the current
potable water supply in Hungary is not adequately protected from these
dangers.28
In short, critical information provided by both governmental and non-
governmental sources reveal the same grave situation which the Hungari-
an Parliament now clearly recognizes. This first step of recognition
should be acknowledged as a significant achievement for a country
which had not dared to open its eyes for several decades. Of even
greater importance, however, is the Hungarian Parliament's subsequent
commissioning of two draft proposals for environmental protection. The
mere existence and considerable content of both drafts are noteworthy
achievements.
II. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE STATUS Quo
Before proceeding to the analysis of the two Hungarian reform
initiatives currently being considered by the Hungarian Parliament, it is
necessary to briefly outline, first, the current Hungarian political and
economic climate, and second, the current legal and administrative
structure. This information proves useful in illustrating the setting for the
current Parliamentary debate. It thus proves essential to evaluating both
26. Id. There are three levels of water quality in Hungary: Class I, Class II, and Class
III. Of these, Class I signifies that the water is "suitable for use in the municipal water
supply." Class II designates water which is "suitable for animal, agricultural and
recreational use." Id. at 38. Class III is water deemed "suitable for industrial use." The
World Bank views these categories as follows: first class water is water which can meet
the quality of various water uses by simple technological treatment. Second class water
needs more complex treatment before it can be used for most purposes. Third class water
hardly meets the quality criteria, even after sophisticated treatment, and is "sufficiently
polluted to jeopardize aquatic life." Id.
27. Id. at 79.
28. Specifically, the World Bank reported, "Of 1,200 public water supplies, more than
400 are expected to become contaminated during the next decade. Out of the presently
utilized 4,780,000 cubic meters of potable water, only 48% is adequately protected from
pollution. 52% is not adequately protected, including the 1,280,000 cubic meters per day
for Budapest. Some quality degradation has been registered in 34% of the water supply
since construction of respective water works." Id. at 79-80.
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the theoretical and the procedural difficulties in implementing each draft.
Most importantly, such information helps to highlight the amazing
comprehensiveness of the two drafts against the unpracticed background
of a newborn democratic Parliament. It is because of this depth that the
Hungarian Parliament and its determined lobbyists should take credit for
the two significant pieces of legislation.
A. The Political Climate: A Multi-Party State
Hungary's silent revolution of 1989 overturned the Communist
dictatorship lead by Imre Pozsgay and ushered in eager hopes for
democratic, capitalist change as well as considerable optimism among
environmentalists that water, air and land pollution issues soon would be
addressed.29 The publication of the 1989 "State of the Environment in
Hungary" report, and the subsequent funding, encouragement and
acceptance of private surveys and evaluations of environmental ailments
were hailed by environmentalists as the first steady steps toward curbing
pollution. In a year when the Hungarian Communist Party removed itself
from power, when a newly formed democratic Parliament renamed the
country the Republic of Hungary,30 when that Parliament adopted a new
democratic constitution, and called for a referendum to elect a new active
president for the first time in forty-two years, anything and everything
seemed possible.3'
The Preamble to the new post-Stalinist Constitution proudly stated:
"The Republic of Hungary is an independent, democratic legal state in
which the values of bourgeois democracy and democratic socialism
prevail in equal measures .... All power belongs to the people, which
29. For lively accounts of public sentiment and political upheaval at the time of these
changes, see the following: Vera Rich, Hungary Affirms a New President, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
4, 1990, at A7; Carol Williams, New Hungary Government Taking Shape, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1990, at A10; Carol Williams, Hungary to Hold First Free Election in 40
Years Today, Los ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 25, 1990, at Al; Henry Kamm, Hungarians Hold
First Free Vote in 42 Years, Shunning a Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1989, at Al;
Norman Kempster, Hungary Free to Leave Alliance, Soviet Aide Says, Los ANGELES TIMES,
Oct. 30, 1989, at A6; Klas Bergman, Jubilant Hungary Sets New Course, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 25, 1989, at 3; Hungary Purges Stalinism From Its Constitution, N.Y. TIMES
INT'L, Oct. 19, 1989; Hungary's Parliament: Yes to Democracy, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct.
19, 1989, at A16; Imre Karacs, Hungarian Parliament Adopts Non-Communist Constitution,
WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1989, at A35; Henry Kamm, Communists and Foes Back a Multiparty
Hungary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1989, at A14.
30. The country was previously named the People's Republic of Hungary. A MAGYAR
K6ZTRSAsAG ALKOTMNYA [Constitution] (Hung.), translated in 7 ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN
& GISBERT H. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 13 (1990).
31. See supra note 30.
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they exercise directly and through the elected representatives of the
popular sovereignty."'32 Of this Preamble and the more than 94 modifica-
tions to the Stalinist Constitition, far and away the two most important
changes concerning environmental reform were the following: First, a
newfound freedom to create political parties was established in place of
the Communist Party's dictatorship, which had dominated the government
for thirty-three years.33 Second, the new position of President of the
Republic was created concurrently with the abolishment of the twenty-one
member, politically impotent presidential council and its ceremonial head,
Bruno Straub. Each of these two developments was of paramount
importance to environmental reform. The first created the opportunity to
form environmental parties. The second established a politically powerful
president who could name a state of environmental emergency, or at least
force the Parliament to address such issues.
Despite the quick formation of at least eight new political parties
ranging from capitalist to socialist, and from grass roots parties to more
formalized and powerful parties, environmental issues were often pushed
to the back. The Hungarian Green Party attempted to win seats in the
Parliament, but it gained less than one percent of the votes and had to
repay state subsidies provided for its campaign.35
The obvious reason for this evasion of environmental issues was the
mainstream parties' preoccupation with the country's economic stagna-
tion. Although the smaller parties focused on specific issues, environ-
mental topics were generally excluded.36 For example, one of the smaller
32. A MAGYAR K6ZTARSASkG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] pmbl. (Hung.).
33. Hungary's Parliament: Yes to Democracy, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 19, 1989, at
A16.
34. The eight new mainstream parties which emerged in October, 1989 are as follows,
in order of their respective number of members: the Hungarian Democratic Forum, with a
membership of 20,000; the Independent Smallholders Party, with a membership of 20,000;
the Social Democrats, with 9,000 to 10,000 members, the rurally based group called the
People's Party, with 7,000 members; the Free Democrats and the Young Democrats with
3,000 to 4,000 votes each; the Christian Democratic People's Party with 1,500 members,
and, lastly, the nationalist Bajcsy-Zsilinszki Society, with 500 members. Henry Kamm,
Communists and Foes Back a Multiparty Hungary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1989, at A14.
35. The World Bank Report suggests that the Hungarian Green Party will remain an
amateur organization for the near future. ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION, WORLD BANK, supra
note 7, at 21.
36. This may be the reason for the current increase in the number of localized but, tiny
grass roots organizations. See Wassersug, supra note 1. According to Stephen Wassersug,
Program Manager of the Regional Environmental Center for Central & Eastern Europe,
located in Budapest, these Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO's) have become very
strong and committed since their first appearance three years ago. Id. Examples of such
groups are the Duna Kor, or the Danube Circle, the Friends of the Earth, and the Blue
Danube movement, although the Regional Environmental Center has lists of thousands of
committed grassroots movements in Hungary. Id. See also ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION,
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parties, the Independent Smallholders party, focused on agrarian reform
in conjunction with the issue of the distribution of private property based
on 1947 ownership records, but did not significantly address environmen-
tal protection reforms.'
Although environmental issues were not at the forefront of election
concerns, they were occasionally addressed. The new Hungarian
government's 1990 "Program for Transition and Development of the
Hungarian Economy," for example, devoted an entire chapter to
environmental protection requirements.38 Although mostly theoretical in
its goals and plans, it was a solid step forward. Hungarian scholar Gyula
Bd.ndi recounts that the Ministry of the Environment consequently
fashioned a relatively meticulous plan of action which included such
reform as the implementation of environmental impact assessments (EIAs)
and specific nature conservation efforts.39 Yet, despite this attention to
the environment, the first concern for all political interest groups revolved
around the stagnant Hungarian economy.'
B. The Economic Climate: Worries Abound
Hungary's poor economic health in comparison to Western Europe
was and is universally identified as the main reason for the lack of focus
on environmental issues. The low Gross National Product figure, the
decreasing annual growth rate, and the limited prospects for economic
improvement all reflect Hungary's economic woes. The desperate state
of the economy currently consumes most of the Hungarian government's
time and efforts. This prevents Hungary from fully addressing its
environmental problems.
Hungary's Gross National Product, in the first available measurement
WORLD BANK, supra note 7, at 20-21.
37. The Independent Smallholders Party has been criticized for advocating the
distribution of land and assets based on these antique records because many of the title
holders have moved to the city, died, or otherwise made their titles obsolete. Yet, many
Hungarians living in rural areas of the country seek to return to their agrarian lives which
were disrupted during the Collectivization Period. See Carol Williams, Hungary to Hold
First Free Election in 40 Years Today, Los ANGELES TimES, Mar. 25, 1990, at Al.
38. See Gyula Bindi, Environmental Law Institute, Environmental Enforcement in
Hungary-Today and Tomorrow (July 31, 1992) (unpublished draft manuscript on file with
the Michigan Journal of International Law).
39. Id.
40. There were other aspects of the new Hungarian Democracy which were expected
to influence environmental protectionism, including greater international commitments
like the 1991 Convention on Transboundary Impact Assessment. See id. at 6-7. See also
Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature Nov. 13,




since the Communist takeover, is the equivalent of approximately 30
billion American dollars in 1989.4" At first glance, this seems reasonable
for a country which has slowly been introduced to a market economy.
Nevertheless, a comparison with the former country of West Germany,
an example of a much stronger and healthier economy, shows the darker
side of Hungary's situation. The former Federal Republic of Germany,
with a population six times greater than Hungary's, enjoyed a GNP forty
times greater than Hungary's.42
Another indicator of Hungary's slowdown in production was the
change in its annual growth rate. From 1965 to 1980, Hungary's annual
growth was 5.6%, undoubtedly due to the massive construction of heavy
industry in a previously agrarian country. From 1980 to 1989, however,
the rate dropped dramatically to 1.6%.' This meant that the growth in
per capita GDP dropped from 5.3% to 1.8%. This left the average
Hungarian with a meager $2,642 annual salary, as compared to the (West)
German average of $19,179. 44
In addition to Hungary's poor status quo, the prospects for improve-
ment seem limited. Vital farmlands have been overused, and Hungary's
industry remains wasteful and underproductive. 45 The country is also in
the midst of a debt crisis. Attempts to remedy the debt crisis through
recovery programs have failed.46 Total external debt in 1989, for
example, was calculated at approximately US $2.6 billion, a strikingly
high figure compared to the GNP.47 The World Bank reports that
approximately 45% of Hungary's export profits are used to cover the
country's interest payments and amortization on this national debt.
4
"The worrisome state of the Hungarian economy has thus forced
mainstream political parties to focus on economic development. Even
environmental scholars are quick to identify the "economic factor" as the
41. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 209, tbl. 3 (1991) (Structure of
Production). These are current figures, not adjusted for inflation.
42. Hungary's 1989 GNP in U.S. dollars was just over $29 billion, while Germany's
1989 GNP amounted to almost $1.2 trillion. Icd at 255, tbl. 26 (Population Growth and
Projections).
43. Id at 207, tbl. 2 (Growth of Production).
44. Id
45. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 41, at 60-61; Hock &
S6mly6dy, supra note 20, at 73.
46. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 41, at 1.
47. The gross national debt per unit GDP ratio is 74%. WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 41, at 250.
48. Id
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clear primary interest of the parties, and rightly so, most will add.49
Andrds Homonnay, Managing Director of ENVIMARK, an environmental
marketing firm, and the lawyer named by Sdndor Kisgyirgy of the
Ministry of Environment and Regional Policy to write the next Parlia-
mentary draft of a Hungarian environmental law, explained that all of
Hungary's environmental responsibilities could be calculated into a price
tag.'0 For example, he states: "We cannot adopt immediately all of [our
environmental] responsibilities. If we sign the European Carta about
emissions, then we have to turn all our vehicles into [those using]
unleaded gasoline. So it is at the present impossible."51  Kisgy5rgy
similarly says: "The affectivity of [the new] law[s] will depend on
economic incentives. It will cause an inflation effect... "52 Economics,
then, or rather the fear of further economic difficulties, fueled the 1989
Hungarian political debates on the eve of the new multi-party democracy.
This economic preoccupation continues.
However, despite Hungary's existing economic decline and predic-
tions of future decreased production, some of Hungary's leading
environmental lawyers do not see the country's economic situation as
cause for total despair. Gyula Bfndi, past Secretary General of the
Hungarian Lawyers' Association, has been quick to point out the
advantages of Hungary's new economic status as a fledgling capitalist
country. For example, Hungary's foreign trade relations will significantly
influence its development path as a capitalist country. 3 First, EEC
environmental protection mandates will require compliance if Hungary is
to continue trade relations with Western Europe.54 Second, Bdndi adds,
foreign trade helps establish Western interests in Hungary which bring
with them advanced technology and investment. He states that "[t]he
development of foreign trade and the involvement of foreign capital and
technology provide a better chance for the financing and use of cleaner
technologies."'5
49. Homonnay, supra note 2.
50. Sindor Kisgytrgy, Department Head of the Ministry of Environment and Regional
Policy, as well as Dr. Peter Literathy of VITUKI, the Water Resources Research Centre,
Institute for Water Pollution Control, both named Homonnay as the potential draftsman of
an updated version of an environmental protection act. See infra part IV.B. for discussion
of current pending legislation.
51. Homonnay, supra note 2.
52. Kisgyirgy, supra note 2.
53. See Bdndi, supra note 38.
54. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DEsKBOOK (1991)
(an overview of the substantial body of EEC environmental law, including all significant
directives, regulations and policies).
55. Bdndi, supra note 38, at 3.
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Despite the prospects of increased Western investment and technolo-
gy, scholars like Bdndi also acknowledge the accompanying drawbacks.
First, since economic incentives for environmental protection are not
interwoven into the limited Hungarian laws on foreign investment, there
is an increased likelihood that foreign investors will invade Hungary with
those proposals that were rejected in their home countries because they
did not meet EEC standards.56 Second, although a capitalist economy
provides greater market strength than its Communist counterpart, most
economists agree that a market economy often harms the environment
when unaccompanied by legislation which mandates accounting for the
social costs of environmental damage; this is the so-called tragedy of the
commons.
Economic developments in Hungary, then, are mixed. Downward
trends and diminished resources sound a warning bell. The new
Hungarian market system has the potential to attract needed technology
and environmentally clean industry. Yet such investment harbors the
capacity to further pollute the environment unless Hungary enacts
preventative legislation.
III. THE CURRENT JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
Another vital backdrop against which to evaluate the two existing
environmental law drafts is Hungary's judicial and administrative
structure. It is this structure which will determine how and whether those
policies incorporated in the two drafts will succeed.
The Hungarian judicial structure, historically and at present reflects
a familiar tiered system of power. Although it currently is a source of
much stagnation, it only needs a jump start and some procedural oiling
in order to bring it to life. Therefore, the drafters deserve credit for
retaining its basic structure.
The Hungarian administrative structure is another story. In the past,
the administrative infrastructure was a mysterious labyrinth of decision-
making power which confused even the architects of the system.57 As a
result, the system itself proved to be its own greatest adversary in the
adjudication of pollution cases.58 The system has recently been rebuilt,
reflecting a reshuffling of administrative power more than a massive over-
56. See id
57. See Wassersug, supra note 2.
58. See id.
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haul.59 Yet, like the judicial system, it is arguable that the drafters were
wise to build on the existing system, rather than attempting to recreate it
from scratch.
A. The Judicial System: Cause of Stagnation
The Hungarian Court system is generally arranged in the same tiered
structure it occupied over the past forty-five years. It consists of local
district courts, with appellate review to the county courts or the Budapest
municipal court, whose decisions are reviewed by the Hungarian Supreme
Court. This is similar to the American federal or state structures.'e
Newly establish in 1990, however, is the Constitutional Court. Its
jurisdiction includes the exclusive power to adjudicate environmental and
civil rights cases.6'
Despite the seemingly well-structured nature of the court system, its
judges and lawyers are extremely inexperienced. This is primarily due
to the thirty-three years of Communist rule, when the Party and its
administrative structure dictated the "law" for all legal actions which
affected private parties. B6.ndi explains:
The role of the administrative organs and the role of the courts were
separated from one another. The administrative organs were responsible
for the active interference into social life, while the courts [played] a
rather passive role in deciding legal disputes ... [Today], the basic
role of the courts has not been changed for the time being . . . the
judicial supervision in most of the spheres of the society and the direct
activity of the courts represents a new concept...62
Although the Constitutional Court holds the power to decide
environmental cases, it has yet to hear or decide any substantive case
since its establishment. Andrds Homonnay, who is also a practicing
Hungarian lawyer states:
Under communism there was a state administration, and it was separate
from the court... Now it has changed, but not enough. It takes time
59. See G6za Kildnyi, Environmental Policy in Hungary: Environmental Legislation,
in STATE OF THE HUNGARIAN ENVIRONMENT 35 (Don Hinrichsen & Gytrgy Enyedi eds.,
1990).
60. As in the United States, the Hungarian court system is composed of courts with
generalized jurisdiction; however, there are specialized courts, namely the Hungarian labor
courts and the military courts. See Gyula Bdndi, The Role of Courts in Environmental
Protection in Hungary (Feb. 1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Michigan
Journal of International Law).
61. ld
62. Id at 1-2 (emphasis added). Note also that up until June 26, 1991, the judiciary




to change to western procedures. There are now some environmental
issues which can be taken to the court after the public administrative
decisions... [but] this is not yet happening.63
As a result of the extremely limited practice of the Hungarian courts in
adjudicating civil disputes, the more experienced administrative system
has led in tentatively addressing these issues. In fact, unlike the
American legal system, which utilizes a combination of judicial,
legislative and administrative sources of law, Hungarian environmental
reform focuses on administrative methods.
B. The Administrative System: Overlapping Authority
Since 1987, the key environmental protection agency in Hungary has
been the Ministry for Environment and Regional Policy.64 This organiza-
tion, however, does not exercise complete control over environmental
protection efforts.6 5 In fact, the responsibilities, powers, and expertise it
shares with other overlapping ministries lead to inefficient use of time
and frequent intragovernmental disputes.6 A limited review of the
history of these overlapping organizations and their respective spheres of
influence and sources of information sheds light on the current situation.
In 1952, the Hungarian government established an administrative
body called the National Water Authority (NWA). It held primary
responsibility for managing the intricate system of water channels that
supplies the country with water.67 The NWA also controlled twelve
regional District Water Authorities (DWAs) located throughout the
country. The DWAs were responsible for monitoring, inspecting,
authorizing permits and assessing penalties.
In 1974-75, however, it became clear that the NWA and its district
offices were unable to handle both the significant responsibility of
controlling water supplies and the early vestiges of water pollution. 8
Consequently, the government modified its administrative structure by
establishing another agency to operate concurrently with the NWA. This
organization was named the Hungarian Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), sometimes referred to as the National Environmental Protection
63. Homonnay, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
64. Government Decree No. 43/1990, reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION, WORLD
BANK, supra note 7, at 23.
65. See Literathy, supra note 2.
66. IL
67. Id.
68. Kil6nyi, supra note 59, at 40.
Spring 1993]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Council.69 It operated through the Hungarian Secretary of State, using the
newly formed Environmental Protection Institute (EPI) as its research
facility.7' This seventeen member organization, with representatives
from the local governments, was primarily responsible for providing
recommendations and comments on all legal drafts involving environmen-
tal issues.7
G6za Kil6nyi, Professor of Hungarian Administrative Law and
Director of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences' Public Law Research
Center, argues that the EPA was largely ineffectual, despite its separate
budget and staff. He explains that "[the EPA was] composed of leading
scientists ... not vested with any political clout. Reduced to grinding
out scientific papers and making recommendations for policy-makers, the
[EPA] was unable to effect needed changes in environmental policy and
enforcement of legislation." 72
Literathy, Director of VITUKI, argues that in addition to its weak
effect on environmental reform, the simultaneous existence of the EPA
and the NWA also caused frequent conflicts.73 One source of conflict
concerned the use of statistical measurements and analyses by each of the
two organizations.74 The Hungarian NWA enlisted the services of
VITUKI, while the EPA used its own source, the Environmental
Protection Institute, to carry out its research.7 ' Frequent disputes over the
scientific, legal and political conclusions drawn from the research caused
a significant rift between the two groups, and left little room for environ-
69. This creation of an EPA which was tethered to the inner layers of the government
via the Secretary of State, seems to indicate the predictable Communist emphasis on control
over all aspects of the industry, which in this case included water control.
70. See Literathy, supra note 2. As the Director of VITUKI Water Resources Institute,
Dr. Literathy has worked closely with many of the various environmental ministries and thus
provided this information on the evolution of Hungary's environmental administrative
structure. Note that other sources have different translations of the titles of these
organizations. For example, what Literathy calls the Environmental Protection Agency,
G6za Kil6nyi, Professor of administrative law and Director of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, calls the Council for Environment Protection.
71. Andrds Saj6, Environmental Protection Code of Hungary (draft, Jan. 1992) (English
translation on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
72. Kil6nyi, supra note 59, at 38.
73. VITUKI has played a significant role in the statistical analysis of Hungary's water
pollution levels over the past 30 years. In 1952, the government began to use the Research
Center as a resource institute and provided significant funding to the Center. In 1985,
however, there was a significant change in the method of funding for the Center. Prior to
1985, the Center operated as part of the regularly maintained state communist budget.
However, from January 1986 on, the Center began to work on an enterprise basis, with no







These disputes continued until 1986, when the Ministry of Environ-
ment and Water Management was established. This ministry oversaw the
previously conflicting organizations: VITUKI, the EPA and the group of
twelve District Water Authorities, which were renamed Environmental
Protection Inspectorates. 7 According to Literathy, these changes helped
considerably in ironing out management conflicts by eliminating the
friction between the EPA and the NWA.78 Similarly, the new Ministry
was able to enlist the research and administrative expertise of both
VITUKI and the EPI because there were no longer two conflicting
agencies, but rather one umbrella ministry.79 However, this administra-
tive structure changed one more time before it reflected the current
Hungarian system.
In 1987, the Hungarian Parliament established the current administra-
tive system.8" In this new system, the Hungarian government granted
administrative control over most environmental issues to the newly
formed Ministry of Environment and Regional Policy.8 This Ministry
has as its subordinate a revisited version of the EPI which now coordi-
nates the twelve regional Inspectorates responsible for local monitoring,
inspecting, authorizing permits, and setting penalties for violations.82
This new administrative structure is adequately equipped to handle
the challenges of an actively working environmental protection program.
It includes a potentially authoritative Ministry which occupies a position
similar to that of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 3 It uses a
system of regional Inspectorates. The Minister appoints a National




79. A few other governmental organizations formed during the 1970s and early 1980s,
which were inconsequential to environmental protection, but help fill out the picture of an
extremely fragmented government initiative to control water pollution. For example, the
National Office for Environmental Protection and Nature Conservation was created by the
Act on Human Environment. This Office accomplished little in the way of uniting the other
organizations, because it only maintained authority over the issue of nature conservation.
All administrative decisions regarding the environment were still made by "various ministers
and a baffling number of other governmental bodies." Kil6nyi, supra note 59, at 38.
Furthermore, the Office's lack of political weight rendered it "ineffective even as a
coordinating body." Id.
80. 1I
81. Saj6, supra note 71, § 45.
82. See id. § 64.
83. Id.
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monitoring and inspection statistics.84 In short, the system includes an
outreach network that could stccessfully be used to evaluate, monitor,
and assist all or most of Hungary's regional areas.
However, two aspects of the administrative structure weaken its
effectiveness. First, like the judicial branch, the Hungarian administrative
branch has limited experience in the field of environmental protection.!
5
Although the different administrative bodies had historically been used by
the Communist Party as a means of controlling the activities of citizens,
companies, and organizations for over thirty years, they had not been
used for environmental improvements.86 As a result, the current
government administrators are somewhat uncomfortable with their new
duties.87 Encouragement by the administrators of more established
environmental management systems, such as those found in the United
States, may improve this situation.
The second weakness in the current Hungarian administrative system
is that the new Ministry for Environmental and Regional Policy exercises
only partial control over the spheres of environmental decision-making.
It shares the decision-making task with at least two other ministries: the
Ministry of Traffic, Water and Communication, and the Ministry for
Social and Health Affairs. 8 Tension and confusion due to overlapping
spheres of influence, power, and responsibility result in constant
procrastination and buck-passing.
For example, the Ministry of Environment and Regional Policy sets
policy targets, writes and elaborates on proposals for Parliament's Council
of Ministries, and coordinates both environmental protection measures
84. See id. §§ 70-71.
85. Homonnay, supra note 2.
86. See Bdndi, supra note 6. See also ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION, WORLD BANK, supra
note 7, at 29 (an environmental impact assessment procedure to investigate projects that
would have a significant effect on the environment was only made mandatory in 1985 and
does not apply to joint ventures or private investments).
87. See Kisgy~irgy, supra note 2.
88. Kildnyi, supra note 59, at 39-40. Again, according to VITUKI's Director, Dr.
Literathy, the old tensions have been reborn. In this round, however, the confusion is
potentially greater. Now, VITUKI often takes on contractual research projects from the
Ministry of Environment and Regional Policy, since that ministry no longer has adequate
research facilities. Id. VITUKI, however, simultaneously carries out research for the
Ministry of Traffic, Water and Communication. Id. Recently, in fact, VITUKI has actually
been spending 60% of its research efforts on behalf of the Ministry of Environment and
Regional Policy, and only 40% of its efforts on the Ministry of Traffic, Water and
Communication, the latter being its official government sponsor. Id As a result, Dr.
Litherathy reports that there is considerable tension among these two overlapping ministries,
presumably because they are wrestling for the undivided attention of VITUKI. Id.
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and water management proposals.8 9 Meanwhile the Ministry for Social
and Health Affairs sets specific limits for potable water and ermissions of
polluting industries. Further complicating the issue, a third ministry, the
Ministry of Environment and Regional Policy enforces those limits.
Similarly, the Ministry for Construction and Settlement Development
controls environmental pollution in settlements, while the Ministry for
Environmental and Regional Policy carries out those directives."°
The division of power within the administration shows that "[d]espite
the promising beginning, the Ministry must still overcome the built-in
inertia that decades of fragmented authority has fostered."91 This inertia
is the primary source of the difficulty, rather than the actual structure of
the Ministry of Environment and Regional Policy. Therefore, the two
environmental reform drafts properly avoided attempts at completely
restructuring this administrative system. Although the first draft relied on
the present general structure, it did mention the possibility of a single
change. The first draft suggested that all administrative power regarding
environmental concerns be concentrated in the Ministry of Environment
and Regional Policy alone. Perhaps, by consolidating authority, this one
change would solve the problem of inertia. Thus, without revamping the
entire administrative system, these two drafts attempt to enact environ-
mental protection.
IV. THE NEWBORN ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION: Two DRAFTS
The two fledgling environmental drafts both seek to establish a
working legal system of environmental protection. The first, released in
January 1992 by Andrds Saj6, Professor of law at the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, runs approximately 300 pages and covers most
aspects of a legal and procedural environmental protection framework.'
The second, written by lawyers within the Ministry of Environment and
Regional Policy as a response to Saj6's Draft, is a much slimmer version
of approximately twenty pages which avows the same objectives, but
seeks them in a slower and more circumspect fashion.
93
89. Id. at 39.
90. Id. at 40. See also ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION, WORLD BANK, supra note 7, at 23.
91. Kil6nyi, supra note 59, at 39.
92. See Saj6, supra note 71.
93. Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Policy, Hungarian Draft Law on
Environmental Protection (1992) (English summary translation on file with the Michigan
Journal of International Law). Note that one extremely significant factor in any comparison
of the two drafts that must be taken into consideration is the fact that the only form of the
Ministry's draft that is currently in English is a summary only. Thus, comparisons dealing
with complexity are limited, and criticisms based on an assumed lack of detail may be due
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Both drafts have been highly criticized. Saj6's Draft, an academic
composition which seeks to incorporate procedural, evidentiary, and
statutory reform within its monumental depth, has been criticized by
government officials and lawyers as being too ambitious, too tedious, and
oddly enough, too vague in some areas.94 The Ministry draft, a weaker
but terser version, has been criticized by environmentalists in both
Hungary and the United States as hypothetical, non-committal, and
impotent.95 Both drafts have been criticized for the extended preparation
time due to the seemingly endless set of debates, criticisms and revisions.
However, both drafts represent milestone achievements when viewed
against Hungary's political, economic, judicial, and administrative
backdrop addressed earlier. Furthermore, the Hungarian government took
merely three years to propose, draft, and critique two comprehensive
environmental reform bills, while Americans delayed environmental
reform for decades. Although congratulations are in order, praise should
come cautiously, as many hurdles must be overcome before the Hungari-
an environment sees tangible improvements.
A. A Scholar's Draft: More Than a Mouthful
Saj6's proposed Environmental Protection Code of Hungary is a
monumental effort to draft a statutory body of law which includes
remedies, penalties, incentives, and goals, as well as procedural, technical,
and administrative planning measures. As such, at times it covers too
much detail, and at other times too little.96
Saj6's Draft is nevertheless a progressive, useful legislative reform
bill which clearly seeks to sooth the frantic worries of unpracticed
government officials. It does so by supplying a wide variety of
procedural, technical, and administrative techniques to assist in the
implementation process.97 More importantly, it aggressively pushes the
Hungarian government forward in its environmental reform initiatives by
implementing demanding rules which require increased state responsibili-
ties in gathering and disseminating information to the public. It also
to the fact that this later draft is only in summary form. It appears that some criticisms of
the Ministry's draft have overlooked this factor. See Bowman & Hunter, supra note 14, at
951-52.
94. See Homonnay, supra note 2; Kisgydrgy, supra note 2.
95. See Bowman, supra note 2; Hunter, supra note 2.
96. See infra part IV.A.2. Note that even the Ministry for Environment and Regional
Policy found the draft difficult to comprehend, despite its initial endorsement of the project.
Wassersug, supra note 2.
97. See, e.g., Saj6, supra note 71, §§ 181-188, 369-386, 553-564, 569-573, 617.
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creates and justifies the public's standing to sue on behalf of the
environment. Finally, Saj6's Draft creates stringent rules requiring
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) before the commencement of
new industrial projects.9"
In order to evaluate this draft comprehensively, it is necessary to
separately address each of the following five most significant changes:
1) administrative organization, 2) procedural requirements, 3) comprehen-
sive state responsibility, 4) information gathering and dissemination and,
5) mandatory Environmental Impact Assessments for industrial projects.
1. Administrative Organization
In order to carry out the extensive duties Saj6 places upon the
Ministry, his draft establishes a complex administrative system of
organization. It builds upon the existing administrative structure of the
various authorities, councils, inspectorates, and boards that have made up
the structure of environmental administration in Hungary for the past
thirty years. As such, it is a workable piece of legislation which will
implement the existing structure in a new and useful manner and create
a meaningful system of checks and balances.
Saj6 adds two advisory boards to the existing structure of the
Ministry of Environment and Regional Policy which now operates and
gathers information from its twelve regional Inspectorates.99 The first
board is derived from the earlier Environmental Protection Agency."
Saj6 calls this seventeen-member organization "the Environmental
Protection Council." It functions as an advisory board to both the
government and the Ministry."'0 Explicitly allocating a separate budget
and staff to the Council, Saj6 commissions it to review and comment on
all environment legal drafts, and to present a yearly state of the environ-
ment address."° Additionally, Saj6 recreates a Board of Environmental
Experts, composed of seven scientific and professional experts who
respond to specialized questions from the government and ministers. 3
These individuals would be appointed by the Prime Minister for six year
terms and are "required" to deliver politically unbiased scientific
98. See Saj6, supra note 71, §§ 377, 430.
99. Saj6, supra note 71, §§ 76-80, 84-87 (establishing the Environmental Protection
Council as an advisory board of the government and the Board of Environmental Experts
as a scientific-professional board).
100. See supra note 71.
101. Saj6, supra note 71, § 76.
102. Id §§ 76(2), 77.
103. lL §§ 84, 86.
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opinions.1" Saj6 thus uses two advisory boards to direct and counsel his
administrative decisionmakers. This administrative structure also
establishes a theoretical system of advisory checks and balances. By
forming an independently funded legal advisory board, as well as an
expert board that supplies unbiased scientific analysis, Saj6's Draft
establishes an administrative system with the potential to develop a
substantial body of environmentally protective laws and regulations.
2. Procedural Framework
Although Saj6's administrative framework encompasses most
administrative necessities, his procedural rules may fail to help the
Hungarian courts navigate through the almost non-existent procedural
framework of the judiciary. Sajo's procedural rules still prove helpful in
pinpointing the areas of procedural guidelines which will need further
elaboration once an active court system and an enacted environmental
protection law exist.
Saj6's procedural guidelines are inadequate for two reasons. First,
they are scattered throughout the text of his draft; they fail to provide a
cohesive procedural framework.105 Second, they try to cover too many
difficult subject areas in too little detail.
The dispersed nature of the procedural rules is at the same time the
most distracting aspect of the rules and the most easily remedied.
Located in four major sections of the draft, they are found in provisions
regarding "Rule Making," and then again in the distant materials
concerning "General Rules of Administrative Protection Procedure."'
06
Likewise, some procedural guidelines are found in the section entitled
"System of Environmental Liability," and also in the section called "The
State of the Environment Audit," (ESA).1°7 Although some of these rules
seem logically arranged in certain sections, such as the separate rules on
environmental audits, others seem lost. For example, the provisions
regarding pre-trial discovery are located in the chapter on environmental
liability, directly following unrelated materials concerning liability
limitations. 10 8 Despite their widespread location, however, these rules,
guidelines and procedures could be coordinated and relocated to form a
cohesive checklist of procedural activities, not unlike those found in the
104. Id. § 85.
105. Id. §§ 183-88, 369-86, 553-64, 569-73, 617.
106. 1& §§ 183-88, 369-86.
107. Id. §§ 553-64, 569-73, 617.
108. Id. § 553.
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U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1°9
The greater difficulty lies in the nature, content, and intent of the
rules. In this draft, Saj6 seems eager to establish procedural rules for
most aspects of litigation. His wide array of topics portray this broad
intent, but, in pursuing this goal, he encompasses both too much and too
little subject matter.
Too much subject matter is covered because these materials establish
both broad and environmentally specific rules ranging from basic trial and
litigation guidelines to regulations concerning standing, costs, penalty
reductions, and litigation fees. 1 ' By comparison, in the U.S. system,
such rules are located in several lengthy compilations such as the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence. The U.S.
rules are laid out separately from most substantive law statutes. Such
procedural issues in Hungary should likewise be separately addressed,
with only the environmentally-specific rules necessary to carry out the
law incorporated into the body of the draft.
At the same time, too little subject matter is covered. Although Saj6
addresses many important procedural topics, he cannot cover any of them
in the depth needed to guide an inexperienced judiciary. Such an attempt
would require expanding his already lengthy draft by several hundred
pages of procedural rules. For example, Saj6 describes his proposed
system of "pre-trial discovery" in a one-page section of his draft."' This
rule requires that "the party reasonably assumed to be the operator"
provide the answer to the following three interrogatories within 30 days:
"(i) [list] the applied machinery or equipment and technology, including
means of protection and extraordinary operations; (ii) [list the] hazardous
materials used and their concentration; [and] (iii) [list all] illegal
emissions."' The rule's only other requirement states that the operator
must provide [data] "related to the activity which is allegedly connected
to the damage."
113
This limited instruction on pre-trial discovery is clearly inadequate to
handle the complexity of these proceedings, particularly in environmental
litigation. By comparison, the annotated court rules for U.S. pre-trial
procedures alone occupy approximately forty pages." 4 Thus, this draft
109. FED. R. Ov. P. 26-37.
110. Saj6, supra note 71, §§ 183-88, 369-86, 553-64, 569-73.
111. 1& § 553.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
Spring 1993]
Michigan Journal of International Law
does not adequately outline specific procedural rules and remedies.
Despite such shortcomings, Saj6's procedural guidelines prove
extremely useful in highlighting areas of administrative procedure which
will require extra attention in the drafting stage. There will undoubtably
be much dispute over which individuals and groups can become parties
to an environmental lawsuit, what kind of information should be revealed
by a polluting corporation, and how an appellate review system should
operate. These are precisely the procedural areas that Saj6's draft
emphasizes." 5
3. State Responsibilities
With the above administrative and procedural framework in place,
Saj6 approaches the body of his environmental reform law. There are
three foci of his attention: increased state responsibilities, information
gathering and dissemination, and Environmental Impact Assessments
(EIAs).1 6 The Draft addresses these areas of reform in considerable
detail. Together, these reforms create a potentially formidable defense
against environmental degradation.
The first of these foci, the Ministry's increased responsibilities, is
essential in carrying out the remaining two objectives. Without a
responsible Ministry, every activity from gathering statistical information
to evaluating EIAs would be infinitely more difficult. Saj6's Draft places
significant responsibility for environmental protection on the national
government, and the majority of such control in the hands of the Ministry
of Environment and Regional Policy. For example, section 45 of the
draft would require that "[i]n harmony with the available resources and
the democratically expressed needs of society the State shall institutional-
ize and operate a public administration system which is capable of
integrated environment protection.""' 7
Section 46 then imposes on the State "a duty to provide for the safe
disposal of waste against reimbursement... ,,8 Reaching further than
just listing the general goal of state-initiated and regulated environmental
protection, the draft specifically lists the methods by which the Hungarian
government is required to carry out these goals.
115. Saj6, supra note 71, §§ 377, 553-55, 181.
116. Id. §§ 45, 96-106, 189, 430-89.
117. Id. § 45 (emphasis added). Note that considerable attention is paid to economic
limitations on environmental protection. This is significant because a similar emphasis on
economic limitations found in the Ministry's draft is criticized for being too weak by
advocates of Sajo's draft. See also Bowman & Hunter, supra note 14, at 951-52.
118. Saj6, supra note 71, § 46 [emphasis added].
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The protection of the environment is effected [sic] by the State primarily
by creating and operating central and regional environmental install-
ments, operating environment protection fiunds, supporting protection
research and education, subventions, and tax and customs preferences.
1 9
The Ministry is also required to prepare and enforce an Environmental
Protection Plan in conjunction with all affected local and regional
governments. This plan would provide detailed instructions on the
implementation, standards, and requirements of the state's environment
protection goals."
In particular, the Minister sets water emission values, taking into
consideration the "holding capacity" of the environment, the global
effects of the emission, and synergisms or dangerous interactions with
other emissions. 2' The Minister must also establish a system of water
quality indicators after extensive consultation with independent experts
and members of the public."
Thus, Saj6's Draft places new-found responsibilities of environmental
protection on the state through its main authoritative body, the Ministry
of Environment and Regional Policy. These broad responsibilities form
the foundation necessary to carry out the encompassing vision Saj6
unfolds in the remaining two areas of environmental reform discussed
below.
4. Information Gathering and Dissemination
Saj6's Draft places considerable emphasis on the importance of
gathering and disseminating regional information concerning environmen-
tal conditions in Hungary. This emphasis, and the detail with which he
describes his proposed information system, could ultimately be responsi-
ble for the initial impetus behind launching a large-scale effort to repair
environmental damage and curtail further harm. As such, it is a
praiseworthy piece of proposed legislation.
Chapter V of the section on Environmental Protection Management
is devoted solely to data and information collection." There, the Draft
lists both national and local information gathering duties to a fine degree
of specificity."2 This chapter begins with the essential caveat that those
119. d. § 48 (emphasis added).
120. Id. §§ 51-55.
121. Id. §§ 227-28.
122. Id. § 229(5)-(6).
123. Id. §§ 96-106.
124. Id.
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who pollute are responsible for reporting their pollution activities.' 5 It
orders:
Those who consume (utilize) natural resources providing those as a
service, or in the course of business activities, are obliged to send all
data about the consumption of the natural resources and about the
strain (impact) upon the environment-as well as evaluations based upon
this information and their other analyses, and documentation concerning
their environmental protection technology and its application-to the
Minister or to organizations specified by the decree of the Minis-
ter .... 126
In addition to requiring self-regulation by companies and industries,
Saj6's Draft requires the Regional Inspectorate to gather the information
and make the following assessments:' 27 1) the quantitative and qualitative
strain on the environment and any noticeable changes "in coherent
statistical form and in [an] internationally comparable manner;" 2) the
sources and causes of damage to the environment "including detailed
tabulations necessary to determine causal relations of damages;" and
3) the continuous environmental effects of state measures.
This draft requires regional, as well as national, planning of environ-
mental protection. The requirements are stiff and aggressive. They are
fashioned to account for environmental deterioration when planning
projects. For example, Saj6 orders:
Land use planning should evaluate the state of the region's environment
in a complex fashion, and . . . [should thus] determine the allowable
strain on the environment... The local and regional land use plans
shall be determined so that the environmental effects permitted do not
burden the neighboring and the national environments.1
The need for meticulously drafted rules of national and regional
information-gathering is apparent from the visible uneasiness of govern-
ment officials who will be responsible for carrying out such tasks.
Sdndor Kisgyirgy, previously mentioned as the Department Head for
Water Pollution in the Ministry of Environment, said in an interview that
he needed "explicit instructions [rather than] suggestions."'2 9  He
explained, "Right now, [comprehensive environment information systems]
125. Even those private individuals or companies that take over currently state-run
industries will be responsible for at least reporting pollution inputs. Id. §§ 607-41.
126. Id. § 96.
127. Id. § 98.
128. Id. § 103(1), (4) (emphasis added).
129. Kisgy6rgy, supra note 2.
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do not exist."'130 Kisgy6rgy also complained that even Saj6's draft,
despite its volume, contained insufficient detail concerning water issues.
He states, "There are only four paragraphs which [specifically pertain to
water management.]", 3 ' Andrds Homonnay identifies the same problem
with a warning. "There is not much of a system of precedents. Most
people cannot keep up with the ever changing laws. My opinion is that
they are not used to doing it.'' 32 Lack of prior experience in dealing with
environmental protection issues necessitates detailed instructions to lead
Hungarians through the process.
Saj6's meticulously detailed description of a mandatory information
gathering system seems to be what at least some government officials are
seeking. His deliberate and substantial emphasis on national and regional
information gathering should be commended, not criticized, for its detail.
Not only does Saj6 outline a pervasive information gathering system, he
places great emphasis on disseminating this information to the public.
33
It is here that his draft most distinguishes itself from the Ministry's Draft,
for he makes it unequivocally clear that Hungarian citizens must have
unhindered rights to environmental information.
Part IV of Saj6's draft is devoted to "social participation in environ-
mental protection proceedings." In his characteristically direct style, he
mandates:
The law protects the citizens' right to participate in public (state and
self-government) decisions concerning the environment .... In order
to protect the responsible participation of society, the state and other
users of the environment shall follow the state of the environment and
environmental public health and they shall make these data accessible
to the public, except where the law states it differently to protect lawful
interests. 134
Saj6 ventures further, however, and explicitly requires that several
different methods of disseminating environmental information be
implemented by the State. 35 For example, he requires that government
officials use the mass media to "provide the public with information on
the most important data concerning the environmental pollution .... ,,36
130. Id.
131. Id
132. Homonnay, supra note 2.
133. Saj6, supra note 71, §§ 189-216.
134. Id. §§ 189(1), § 190(1) (emphasis added).
135. It is important to note here that Saj6 does allow room for the protection of State
and private trade secrets. Id. § 192.
136. Id. § 191(1).
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He advocates publicly accessible data banks and mandatory publishing
requirements for "planned environment protection and environmentally
significant decisions," as additional methods of informing the public.'37
In short, Saj6 leaves little room for the government to squirm out of its
duty to inform the public.
The rights of Hungarians extend further than their access to informa-
tion. In fact, Saj6's Draft grants the public the broad power to affect the
outcome of most State environmetal activities. 138 He grants considerable
power and legitimacy to formal public interest "associations" which are
registered with the State.139 These associations have the recognized right
to participate in: 1) proceedings addressing the "transformation of
landscape or surface;" 2) drawing up zone projects and environmental
protection plans; 3) proceedings concerning building permits; and 4)
proceedings concerning the location of construction plans.' 4
If organized into one of these formal "associations," Hungarians have
standing to sue on behalf of the environment. Section 550 states in
pertinent part that "[a] citizens' environmental association, the Inspector-
ate General, or a state organization entitled by decree.., can sue for
damage done to elements of the environment or environmental systems.
... , 4 This sweeping and unmitigated power to sue on behalf of the
environment is a significant power which has worried some governmental
officials. Kisgybrgy voices this fear: "There is a water monitoring
system ... but the bridge with the public has not yet been built. The
question is-are they mature enough?"' 42  Elaborating, Kisgy6rgy
explains that the public knows so little about balancing environmental
interests with economic necessity that the outcome could be disastrous.
The solution, he says, is often to downplay the gravity of environmental
damage. The consequence, he adds, is growing public distrust. "We are
accused of lying, of giving too optimistic of a picture. [The issue is]
what is the price of information?"'43
Kisgy6rgy's concerns are far from isolated. Andris Homonnay, the
Hungarian lawyer named to write another draft environmental law, echoes
these fears in his comment: "It will take time until [the public] is trained
137. Id. § 191(1)-(7).
138. Id. §§ 198-205.
139. Id. § 199(1).
140. Id. § 204.
141. Id. § 550(1).




that environmental problems are always a matter of compromise."'" He
describes a recent move by-the government to dispose of toxic wastes in
a small village in southwestern Hungary. He explains that a "technically
absolutely safe" disposal area surrounded in 100 meters of thick clay
existed in a mountainous area, but the local villagers blocked this action
with their public opposition. 4 ' He explains that "[t]hey are not cleared
up about the real danger, they only know that the toxic wastes are stored
near their village. Now they have the right to oppose."'
However, it is precisely this newly granted right to participate and
influence the governmental actions which will force a hesitant Parliament
to address these issues. For this reason, Saj6's draft has been hailed by
both American and Hungarian scholars as an excellent example of a
legislative proposal granting environmental control to those most affected
by its degradation: the public. 47
5. Environmental Impact Assessment
Another significant achievement of Saj6's Draft is his requirement for
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs)."' The EIA provisions
require any company or organization, including the State, embarking upon
a new project that will have a "substantial effect on the environment," to
file an EIA before commencing any such activity. 49 These provisions are
worth reviewing in some detail, for if such thorough procedures were
heeded, they would provide worthy assistance to environmental protection
efforts.
Saj6's Draft contains a lengthy list of what information must be
included in an EIA: the location of the proposed activity, the state of the
surrounding environment, the capacity of that environment to sustain any
industrial burden, any possible mitigating efforts to repair or improve
environmental damages, expected consequences to public health,
environment and economy, and the direct and indirect effects of possible
waste disposal and recycling.
150
144. Homonnay, supra note 2.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Wilkinson, supra note 2; Bowman, supra note 2; Hunter, supra note 2.
148. Saj6, supra note 71, §§ 429-89.
149. Id. § 429.
150. Id. § 430(a)-(g). Note that some form of these EIA requirements must also be carried
out for those installations which are currently operating. In those cases, Sajo suggests one of
two alternatives. The first recommends that ELAs only be required from July 1, 1994 on. The
second suggestion authorizes the Minister to determine individually by decree which activities
must include an EIA, with the possibility of retroactive effect. Id. § 435.
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The above information is then sent to the appropriate environmental
Inspectorate which evaluates the EIA and determines whether to grant a
license to the proposed activity.' At this point, the Inspectorate also has
the power to require the requesting organization to supplement the
existing EIA with additional information, or to research and develop
better environmentally protective alternatives.152 These requirements
would prove of great assistance in requiring both domestic and foreign
industries to include environmental damage in their cost-benefit analyses.
Although such requirements place a significant burden on fledgling
industries, they force both industry and government to take note of
environmental deterioration.
In summary, Saj6's Draft seeks to encompass all aspects of a massive
system of environmental protection: its administration, its procedures,
and its responsibilities. It simultaneously attempts to address every
concern, lack of understanding, lack of direction, or fear on the part of
a hesitant, inexperienced bureaucracy. This is an ambitious task, but one
that Saj6 has gone to great lengths to achieve. His successes and his far-
reaching vision deserve praise.
B. A Ministry's Draft: Too Trim But Still Ambitious
In comparison to Saj6's Draft, the environmental protection bill
prepared by the Ministry of Environment and Regional Policy is a terser,
weaker version. Despite its more passive language, many of its
provisions are remarkably protective of the environment, and most of
them require the Hungarian government to implement far-reaching
changes.
1. Still Strong on Reform
The Ministry's Draft seeks to enforce many of the same provisions
as that of Saj6. First, it requires increased State responsibility for
protecting the environment. Second, it underlines the importance of data
collection and distribution. Third, it grants public standing to individuals
to represent the environment in lawsuits. Lastly, it requires the imple-
mentation of Environmental Impact Assessments. This draft is an
ambitious move on the part of Parliament to tie itself down to specific,
manageable duties, although it is not as encompassing as Saj6's Draft.
In the Ministry's Draft, Parliament has saddled itself with the




following significant responsibilities: "Setting up an institutional
framework to safeguard environmental values, to serve the harmonized
connection of man and environment, and to ensure an environment
serving human health and welfare."153 This mandate is very similar to
that provided by Saj6, who requires the State to "institutionalize and
operate a public administration system which is capable of integrated
environmental protection."'' 54 In fact, the Ministry's version continues to
specifically state that "[t]he elements of the environment should be
protected against any effect, burden or impact which harmfully effects
[sic] the regeneration capacity, is hannful to the human health, or
damages the human living condition."155 Although a critical eye will note
the use of the word "should" instead of "shall," as well as the Ministry's
subtle emphasis on pollution's effect on human interests rather than the
environment, this mandate is far from empty.
The Ministry's Draft, like Saj6's Draft, establishes a useful data
collection and distribution system which emphasizes citizens' rights.
56
Because the Ministry's English translation is in outline form, however, it
is difficult to compare the depth of the two drafts' discussion on
information collection and dissemination.
Despite such comparative difficulties, the Ministry seems to establish
an information system which is as powerful as that found in Sajo's
Draft.157 In Articles 38 and 39, the Ministry's Draft creates a National
Environmental Information System with territorial inspectorates which
carry out data collection throughout Hungary. 5 ' This data will be not
only available to the public, but also actively disseminated to the public
through an educational system.'59 The Ministry's Draft states: "[There
exists] a right of citizens to obtain environmental knowledge and develop
their own knowledge. The part of the Program [on environmental
pollution] for general school education should be built into the National
Education Plan."'1'6 More specifically, the Ministry Draft requires that
"[tihe state, the local governments and the users shall record the state of
the environment and make the data available ... The plans of decisions
153. Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Policy, supra note 93, art. 1(1)
(emphasis added).
154. Saj6, supra note 71, § 45.
155. Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Policy, supra note 93, art. 11.
156. Id. arts. 38, 42, 104.
157. See Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Policy, supra note 93.
158. Id. art. 38(l)-(3).
159. Id. arts. 42, 43.
160. Id. art. 42(1), (6) (emphasis added).
Spring 19931
Michigan Journal of International Law
affecting greatly the environment must be publicized."'16 Not only does
the Ministry's Draft provide for the gathering and disseminating of
information, but like the Saj6 Draft, it instills important rights in public
environmentalist groups. Most importantly, it grants these groups the right
to initiate environmental protection litigation.' 62
The Ministry's Draft also establishes an Environmental Impact
Assessment requirement, similar to that found in Saj6's longer draft.
Under the Ministry's version, such EIAs would require a preliminary
study of "short and long term social, health, and economic effect."' 63
More specifically, like Saj6's EIA provision, the Ministry's draft requires
the following information regarding any "activities having a significant
impact on the environment:"'' " studies of the current state of the
environment in the target area, methods of safe waste disposal, possible
mitigating measures, and possible impacts on health, environment, and
economy.' 65 This EIA must then be sent to the Environmental Mediation
Council which gives an opinion on whether such an activity is allow-
able. %
In sum, the environmental protection act drafted by the Ministry
echoes the requirements of the Saj6 Draft at almost every turn. It
requires information gathering and dissemination, public participation, and
EIAs as prerequisite to any industrial project which would adversely
affect the environment.
2. Greater Emphasis on the Economy
What the Ministry's Draft does not include is as noticeable as what
it does include. Compared to the Saj6 Draft, there is a greater emphasis
on economic considerations, a limited number of procedural guidelines,
and a weaker system of administrative checks and balances. All told,
however, this draft is still a worthy piece of reform legislation.
One concrete criticism might be the draft's greater concern with the
effect of environmental protection legislation on the economy. Unlike
Saj6's draft, the Ministry's Draft predictably weighs the economy's health
as at least as important as that of the public. Article 25 states: "In
decision-making, the economic, economy and business aspects and the
161. Id. art. 104(1), (3) (emphasis added).
162. Id. art. 103.
163. Id. art. 21.
164. Id. art. 68(1).
165. Id. art. 69.
166. ld. arts. 24, 29.
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environmental aspect should equally be taken into consideration. 167
Although this emphasis on the economy might be a more realistic
approach, it predictibly diminishes the importance of environmental
protection. Because most environmentally safe business ventures will
cost more in the short-term than those which do curtail wasteful by-
products, environmental protection measures could almost always be
avoided because of "economic considerations." As a result, the Minis-
try's Draft may allow a much weaker water pollution reform initiative.
A second criticism of the Ministry's Draft is that it contains
inadequate procedural guidelines. Article 59 simply states that "[a] trial
should be held if the party wishes so, or in the case of ex officio
procedure, if there are more than 10 interested parties., 168 This does not
explain to a novice judiciary precisely how and when such a trial should
occur, and how discovery, correspondence, and preliminary disputes
should take place. Although it may be appropriate to write a separate set
of procedural guidelines for all cases, not just environmental ones, as
discussed, supra, one sentence is inadequate even to provide instructions
on where to seek more thorough procedural rules.
A last fair criticism of the Ministry's Draft is that its administrative
structure of checks and balances is weakened by its lack of economically
independent advisory boards as found in Saj6's Draft. In particular, the
"Environmental Mediation Council" created by the Ministry's draft does
not control its own budget, as does the council equivalent in Sajo's
draft. 169 Instead article 29 merely states that this council "shall be set up
parallel to the government," without describing any separation of power
or self sufficiency. 171
All told, the Ministry's Draft suffers from deficiencies in particular
areas which Saj6's Draft covers. Still, it mandates an unprecedented state
effort to protect the environment by echoing many of the Saj6 provisions
concerning topics such as information gathering and dissemination, public
standing to sue on behalf of the environment, and the importance of
EIAs.
167. Id art. 25 (emphasis added).
168. Id. art. 59.
169. Saj6, supra note 71, § 76(2).
170. Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Policy, supra note 93, art.
29(1).
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CONCLUSION
In just three years since the fall of Hungarian Communism, the new
democratic government has proven itself to be deserving of cautious
praise for its environmental reform initiatives. The government first
gathered statistical information and removed political barriers to non-
governmental studies which confirmed the poor quality of Hungarian
water sources. Then, against a backdrop of an inexperienced judiciary,
a complicated administrative structure, and a weak economy, Hungary
managed to produce two impressive environmental law drafts. Both
require the government to take on the bulk of the responsibility for
improving environmental conditions in Hungary. Either version would
travel far in the direction of cleaning up Hungary's polluted environment.
